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JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this matter
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (k) (1996) ; and Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(2)(h)(1996).
DETERMINATIVE LAW
Pursuant to Rule 24(a)(6) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, there are no constitutional provisions nor statutes
whose interpretation is determinative or of central importance to
the appeal.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Plaintiff's Motion for Directed Verdict was focused solely on
the

co-Defendant,

Authority.

Bradley

Bryant,

and

not

Plaintiff's Motion was based on

the

Utah

Transit

Bryant's responses to

questions relating to his own perceived "failure to yield" and the
UTA did not need to respond to Plaintiff's Motion at the trial
level nor should it be required to do so on appeal.
The

trial

court

correctly

denied

Plaintiff's

Motion

for

Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict based upon all the facts and
evidence presented to the jury. Material issues of fact upon which
a jury could reasonably rely included Bryant's admission that he
did not know exactly why the bus driver put his hand up, no verbal
communication

occurred

between

the

drivers,

and

importantly,

comparative fault arguments on the Plaintiff himself.
Additionally, the trial court instructed the jury that "the
waiving

of another driver

to proceed

in front of you

is not

negligence since all drivers should know that the waving driver
1

does not have the authority to give up a right-of-way belonging to
another

driver.

connected

with

However,
other

such

conduct

circumstances

can

be

negligence

relating

to

the

accident scene, conditions of the roadway, etc."
No. 48)

if

accident,

(See Instruction

In light of all the evidence and inferences presented,

together with applicable law, the trial court correctly allowed the
jury to decide the matter.
Finally,
Plaintiff's

the

trial

questionnaire

court was under no obligation
and

conducted

adequate

eliminate bias and prejudice from the courtroom.

to use

voir dire

to

First, the trial

judge asked a series of questions to the panel as a whole and then
individually, probing each potential juror for possible bias or
preconceived opinions. Second, the trial court allowed the parties
to conduct personal voir dire with Plaintiff failing to ask one
single question to one single juror on tort reform.
ARGUMENT
I. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT WAS DIRECTLY
FOCUSED ON BRADLEY BRYANT AND NOT THE UTA
At the conclusion of Plaintiff's case-in-chief on February 19,
1997,

Plaintiff made a motion for directed verdict

as to the

liability of Defendant, Bradley Bryant, pursuant to Rule 50(a),
U.R.C.P.

Specifically, Plaintiff stated:

Ms. Conklin:
Yes, your honor. Actually, the Plaintiff
would like to move for a directed verdict on the issue of
liability only as to Mr. Bryant based on his admission
that he failed to yield the right-of-way, which would
then leave, if it was granted, just the question of
apportionment.
(R. Vol. II 234: 2-7).

2

Plaintiff's motion was denied by the Court on February 21,
1997.

(R. Vol. IV 39: 15-20 and Dist. Ct. R. 618).
Following the verdict, Plaintiff made a Motion for Judgment

Notwithstanding the Verdict pursuant to Rule 50(b), U.R.C.P.
Again, the trial court denied this motion. (Dist. Ct. R. 618) .
As clearly manifest in the record, Plaintiff's motion was
directed solely at Bryant and not the Utah Transit Authority.

The

motion was based on Bryant's responses regarding questions relating
to his own perceived "failure to yield."

Plaintiff's motion was

not directed at the Utah Transit Authority nor was it responded to
at the trial level, and it need not be addressed by this Defendant,
nor this Honorable Court, on appeal.1
II. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DENIED PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT
BASED UPON ALL THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED
The

evidence

presented

by

sufficient to support the verdict.

the

parties

to

the

jury

was

Plaintiff's conclusory remarks

found in Point II of his argument are based only on a portion of
the record while omitting critical details as they pertain to the
Utah Transit Authority.

1

Pollesche v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 27 Utah 2d 430, 497
P.2d 236 (1972).
The failure of a party to make a motion for a
directed verdict not only forecloses the trial court from
consideration of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict,
but such failure in addition precludes the appellate court from
reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict.
Rule 50(b), U.R.C.P.; Bricrham v. Moon Lake Electric Assn., 24 Utah
2d 292, 296, 470 P.2d 393 (1970) . Consequently, plaintiff may not
allege error on the part of the trial court in its denial of the
motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
3

First, Plaintiff asserts that while "it is possible that the
jury found that Bryant completely misinterpreted the driver's hand
signals [yet] .

.

. this explanation simply does not hold water."

(See Appellant's Brief, p. 10).
admitted

to

the

jury,

with

In point of fact, Bryant clearly

the

assistance

of

his

deposition

testimony during cross-examination, that he did not know exactly
why the bus driver put his hand up.

(R. Vol. I 197: 2-5) . Bryant

interpreted the hand signals to motion him through although he did
not know why the driver put his hand up.
Second,

no verbal

communication

occurred

between

the

bus

driver and Bryant whatsoever, leaving any hand gestures open to
individual interpretation (R. Vol. I 195: 12-19).

No conversation,

oral communication or statement was entered into by the bus driver
and Bryant although the co-Defendant, Mr. Bryant, was quite adamant
that "we both knew what I was there for, to turn . . .

he knew

what he was there to do was to help - let me get over."

(R. Vol.

I 195: 21-24).
Again, the bus driver was never identified by any party as the
bus

was

merely

listed

as

a

non-contract

vehicle

by

the

investigating officer (R. Vol. I 159: 22-24).
Third, and quite importantly, Plaintiff argues that "these
facts, when considered in conjunction with the instruction, leave
the jury with two possible conclusions .
was negligent or, .
fault."

.

.

. that either Bryant

. alternatively, that the bus driver was at

(See Appellant's Brief, pp. 11-12).

4

Whatever happened to

the possible conclusions that, perhaps, the Plaintiff was at fault
or no one was to blame?
The record is replete with evidence, facts, and inferences
that Mr. Durrant was at fault regarding this accident, irrespective
of the allegations made by Plaintiff.

Again, counsel for Bryant,

highlighted four specific areas in her closing argument to the
jury, based upon the evidence, directly relating to Plaintiff's
actions.

They include (1) Plaintiff's negligence in failing follow

traffic signs, (2) Plaintiff's failure to merge into the left lane
in a reasonable manner,

(3) plaintiff's failure to operate his

vehicle at a speed that was reasonable for the conditions, and (4)
Plaintiff's failure to keep a safe and proper lookout.

(Rptr. T.

20: 7-25; 21: 1-12).
Apparently, the jury was persuaded by these and other similar
arguments

as reflected

in their decision

and the trial

court

correctly denied Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding
the Verdict discerning ample evidence to support their verdict.
Finally, Plaintiff cites Giron v. Welch, 842 P.2d 863 (Utah
19 92), under the proposition that "Bryant was not reasonable in
relying on the bus driver's signals" thus supporting his position
that

"this

finding

is

similarly

inconsistent

finding that Bryant was not negligent."

with

the

jury's

(See Appellant's Brief,

p.10) .
The Supreme Court held in Giron the following:
Both parties agree that Devine controls the outcome
of this case. In that case, we concluded that the trial
court erred in denying a motion for a directed verdict in
favor of a signaling driver under
circumstances
5

substantially similar to the instant case. We held that
as a matter of law the signalling of another driver to
proceed was not an act of negligence. We there wrote:
All the signal amounted to, if given, was a
manifestation on the part of Metcalf to Mrs.
Cook that as far as he was concerned Mrs. Cook
could proceed. At the most all he did was to
signal to Mrs. Cook and indicate, as far as
Metcalf was concerned, he yielded her the
right-of-way.
It further noted:
It is possible that under certain conditions upon
certain highways, such as hills or in the nighttime, a
driver of a motor vehicle in signalling a car following
such a vehicle to proceed, might, by such a signal or
conduct on the part of the driver, be responsible for an
accident in which the person relying upon such signal to
proceed became involved. Id. at 864 (quoting Devine v.
Cook, 3 Ut.2d 134, 279 P.2d 1073, 1083 (1955)).
Such conditions as outlined by the Supreme Court, i.e., hills
and nighttime, were not present in the case at hand as clearly
presented to the jury by both drivers.
Following

Plaintiff's

case-in-chief,

(R. Vol. I 204: 8-13).
Defendant,

Utah

Transit

Authority, made a Motion for Directed Verdict, based upon Giron and
Devine, which motion was denied by the court. (R. Vol. II 216-232:
23) .
Notwithstanding these facts and arguments, the trial court
stated that material issues of fact would need to be decided by the
jury and allowed the decision to be made by them.

A decision was

made based upon sufficient evidence presented to them. And whether
or not their deliberations included a bus driver relinquishing only
his right-of-way in his lane of travel (See Jury Instruction No.
48) , or the perceived fault of either Bryant and/or Durrant, or
neither; such discussions were solely within the province of the
6

fact-finder

t : • decide

based

upon

all

the

evidence

presented.

Indeed, the trial c : i irt cor re ::t .] y : : : i ::] l i *• :i t .1 • it i tateri a] issues • :
fact were present and allowed the jury to reach a conclusion and
likewise, denied Plaintiff's Motion Notwithstanding the Verdict.
Ill THE DISTRICT COURT HAD NO OBLIGATION TO
1 DMINISTER PLAINTIFF'S QUESTIONNAIRE AND
CONDUCTED SUFFICIENT VOIR DIRE TO ELIMINATE
BIAS AND PRECONCEIVED OPINIONS FROM THE COURTROOM
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transcript
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and

opinions

ai;d specific e x a m p l e s .

Judcr^ T a y l o r

Court

stated:

re g o i n g to ao in tne next few m o m e n t s

to be asking questions of each of you.
the questions are not to embarrass anyone
feel bad. The questions are simply so
to know you, so that we can hear - so we

As a

can hear you talk, and so we can kind of get a feel for
who you are.
The second reason relates to the fact that there are
only eight of you who are going to be called upon to
serve as jurors in this case, and what we're going to be
seeking are eight people who can be completely neutral,
who will be willing to sit and listen carefully to the
evidence and decide the case based upon that evidence,
not based upon some preconceived notion or how you feel
about a particular thing. A willingness to be neutral,
to listen to the facts, to listen to the law, and to
render justice. That's - that's why we need to talk to
you and kind of get to know you. (R. Vol. I 4: 8-25, 5:
1-11) .
Following this commentary and outline, the judge asked four
specific

questions

to

the

jury panel

as

a whole.

They

luded:
1.

Is there any of you here who can recall
specifically reading articles on - on the need
to change the system?

2.

Do any of you remember reading anything like
that?

3.

Is there anybody here who has not heard of
these kinds of cases where - where you felt
like there maybe was an excessive judgment?

4.

Anybody here who has not heard of those kinds
of cases?
(No response)

Vol. I 26: 16-23).
As an addendum to this series of questions, the court stated:
The court: The concern of the court is that we have a
case here to try. If - if someone comes into the trial
with a preconceived notion that a particular result
should be brought about - in other words, if someone has
a preconceived notion of whether the plaintiff should win
or the plaintiff should lose, a preconceived notion about
if - if the plaintiff wins how much money should be
awarded, I kind of need to know if - if you have some
pretty strong feelings about that sort of thing. We - we
want the - we want this case to be decided upon the facts
8

that are adduced here in this court and not be influenced
by someone's preconceived notions of what ought to happen
or ought not to happen. Do you see mv c.n^r.&r^^
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at the hands of a trial judge.
The modern voir dire process is not merely conducted to
determine that jurors who have been called to service are
legally qualified to serve on a jury panel. The process
has evolved into a means of detecting and, so far as
possible, elimi nati ng b ^ ^
-^
.-^i^i^
^^^^
^-^
courtroom
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peremptory challenges as required by the Supreme Court of this
great

state.
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State
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Wort hen,
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(Utah

i I

Second, following the court's own vcir lire cf eacn and every
potential paror regarding possible bias ar/i - -^-udice, Judge Taylor
c

1
i::'
:)i lduct personal

*

\ .:: a-re ^f t:.-r panel commencing with m e

ramtiff.

The court: Did you wish LO address questions directly to
the panel?
Mr. Conkli.i.

-, ^w, ; Gur Honor.
9

The court:

. . .

go ahead, Mr. Conklin.

(R. Vol. I 98: 23-25, 100: 19).
Thereafter, Plaintiff's counsel gave the following preamble to
the

jury

panel

collectively,

followed

up

with

a

variety

of

questions to specific individuals and the group as a whole.2
Ladies and Gentlemen, this is the time where the
attorneys have an opportunity to ask the panel some - or
some individuals some questions. And if I were sitting
where you are, I would be thinking I've already answered
every question that I want to answer and this is taking
a long time.
Let me explain to you, its our - our responsibility in
representing our client to make sure that we understand
that there are no biases, or that you come in as we like
to call it, with a clean slate. And the court has asked
almost all the questions that we really need to ask, but
I'm going to ask the panel as a whole a couple of
questions and if its redundant, I am sorry but well, just
indulge me. Okay. (R. Vol. 101: 3-17).
Plaintiff alleges that the District Court erred in failing to
conduct adequate voir dire regarding tort reform without so much as
asking one question on the subject himself.

Was Plaintiff somehow

precluded from asking voir dire questions on tort reform on the
simple

basis

that

the District

Court

did not use

Plaintiff's

questionnaire?
It seems ironic that Plaintiff would quote the Supreme Court
in Ball, 685 P.2d

1055, 1066

(Utah 1984) when it stated,

"The

fairness of a trial may depend on the right of counsel to ask voir
dire questions designed to discover attitudes and biases, both

2

Plaintiff repeatedly queried the jury panel whether they
could be "fair and impartial to both sides" as evidenced on at
least five (5) occasions on the record."
(R. Vol. I 105: 10, 22;
106: 14; 107: 8-9; and 108: 9 ) .
10

conscious

and

subconscious, even

though

supported a challenge for cause,'"

they

'would not

have

(p. 13?) and yet not ask a

single question to a single juror concerning tort reform when given
the opportunity to do so by the court itself.
Is it Plaintiff's actual position that the "only viable way to
ensure a plaintiff's right to a fair trial" rests with a trial
court's use of a questionnaire?

(See Appellant's Brief, p. 19)

If

so, it might do Plaintiff justice to review centuries of jury-trial
practice wherein no such questionnaires were ever utilized.
CONCLUSION
This honorable court need not address Plaintiff's Motion for
Directed Verdict concerning UTA as it was not directed at this
Defendant.

Further, this honorable court should affirm the trial

court's denial of Plaintiff's Motions for Directed Verdict and
Judgment

Notwithstanding

the

Verdict

based

upon

the

evidence

presented to the jury and the material issues of fact upon which
they could base their decision.

Finally, the court should find

that the trial court had no obligation to administer plaintiff's
questionnaire and conducted sufficient voir dire to eliminate bias
and preconceived opinions from the courtroom.
DATED this 10th day of December, 1997.
HANSON, EPPERSON & WALLACE
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DANIEL S. McCONKIE
Attorneys for Defendant
Utah Transit Authority/Apdellee
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